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In re Chateaugay Corp.: 
An Analysis of the Interaction Between 
the Bankruptcy Code and CERCLA 
INTRODUCTION 
Many statutes passed by Congress are passed with a par-
ticular policy objective. When statutes with differing policy 
objectives conflict, the judicial system is left with the difficult 
task of sifting through the competing policy objectives to decide 
which should take priority. The conflict between the Bankrupt-
cy Code1 and the Comprehensive Environmental Response 
Compensation Liability Act (CERCLA? is an example. The 
Bankruptcy Code's principal policy objective is to provide the 
bankrupt debtor with protection from its creditors - giving the 
debtor a "fresh start" free from past encumbrances.3 CERCLA's 
main policy objective is to prevent the release or threatened 
release of hazardous substances into the environment and to 
allocate the financial burden of cleaning up such releases to the 
responsible parties. 4 The conflict between these policy objec-
tives arises when a party who has been allocated the financial 
burden of cleaning up a piece of property under CERCLA files 
for bankruptcy, and seeks the protection from claims by poten-
tial creditors. This protection against claims by potential credi-
tors may include cleanup claims brought under CERCLA. 
Recently, in In re Chateaugay Corp., 5 the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit was faced with the 
dilemma of sorting through the conflict in these two statutes to 
determine which of the conflicting policy objectives will be 
applied. This note examines the Second Circuit's analysis in In 
re Chateaugay Corp . . 6 Part I of this note discusses the facts 
1. The Bankruptcy Code begins at 11 U.S.C. § 101 (1988). 
2. CERCLA begins at 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (1988). 
3. THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPI'CY LAW, 225 
(1986). 
4. See Thomas J. Salerno, Roger K. Ferland & Craig D. Hansen, Environmen-
tal Law and its Impact on Bankruptcy Law; Saga of "Toxins-R-Us", 25 REAL PROP. 
PROB. & TR. J. 261, 263 n.2 (1990). 
5. 944 F.2d 997 (2d Cir. 1991). 
6. ld. 
443 
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involved, and the procedural history of the Chateaugay case, 
including an overview of the district court's holding. Part II of 
this note discusses the holding of the Second Circuit in 
Chateaugay, on four main issues: A) the dischargeability of 
CERCLA claims in a bankruptcy proceeding; B) the 
dischargeability of claims for injunctive relief brought under 
CERCLA; C) whether the policy objectives of CERCLA override 
the "fresh start" policy of the Bankruptcy Code; and D) the 
priority CERCLA claims will take in a bankruptcy proceeding. 
Part III of this note discusses and analyzes the Second Circuit's 
reasoning in deciding each issue in this case. 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURE OF DISTRICT COURTS DECISION 
A. Facts 
In Chateaugay, 7 the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) brought claims for violations of environmental regula-
tions, including CERCLA, against the LTV corporation. LTV is 
a diversified steel, aerospace, and energy corporation, with 
operations in several states, including New York.8 In July of 
1986, LTV sought protection from its creditors under Chapter 
11 of the Bankruptcy Code.9 In the process of reorganization, 
LTV submitted 24 pages of environmental claims it considered 
contingent within the meaning of the bankruptcy code. 10 If the 
court found the claims to be contingent, the Bankruptcy Code 
would discharge them. 11 The EPA opposed the discharge of 
the claims, stating that the contingent "claims" were not claims 
within the meaning of the Bankruptcy code. 12 The EPA had 
previously sought to collect $32 million in response costs that it 
had incurred prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition.13 
7. !d. 
8. !d. at 999. 
9. !d.; see 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (1988) (providing the relevant provisions of 
the Bankruptcy Code that relate to Chapter 11 proceedings). A Chapter 11 pro-
ceeding is more commonly known as a reorganization proceeding, and commonly 
involves an ongoing entity that is seeking temporary relief from its debts to 
reorganize itself. The purpose of a Chapter 11 proceeding is to substantially relieve 
the corporation of substantially all of its obligations which have arisen prior to and 
during the commencement of the Chapter 11 proceeding. See generally JACKSON, 
supra note 3, at 209-24. 
10. Chateaugay, 944 F.2d at 999. 
11. !d. at 1000. 
12. !d. 
13. !d. at 999. 
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Additionally, of the sites listed on the 24 pages of claims, only 
one had been treated to the point where no more costs would 
be incurred in cleanup. Due to future response costs that may 
be incurred, the EPA claimed that it could assert claims that 
greatly exceeded the $32 million claim for which they had al-
ready filed. 14 
B. Procedural History 
The EPA originally brought the case in the United States 
District Court for the Southern District of New Y ork.15 LTV 
had informed the Government that it expected confirmation of 
a reorganization plan to discharge all obligations concerning 
environmental liabilities that were traceable to their pre-peti-
tion conduct. LTV expressed to the Government that they 
sought to include in the discharge, obligations for response 
costs that were incurred after the filing of the bankruptcy peti-
tion as long as they related to pre-petition conduct. 16 The EPA 
sought the following declaratory judgements from the district 
court: A) response costs incurred post-confirmation pursuant to 
CERCLA are not dischargeable claims under the Bankruptcy 
Code; B) environmental injunctive complaints obtained under 
CERCLA are not efforts to collect money judgments and there-
fore are not dischargeable in a bankruptcy proceeding; and C) 
environmental claims obtained pursuant to CERCLA and New 
York environmental claims that are incurred after the filing of 
the bankruptcy petition are expenses necessary to preserve the 
estate and are therefore entitled to an administrative priori-
ty17 in the bankruptcy settlement.18 
C. Overview Of The District Court's Decision 
The district court in Chateaugay found that certain 
CERCLA claims were dischargeable in a bankruptcy proceed-
ing. 19 They reasoned that in order for an environmental claim 
14. ld. 
15. In re Chateaugay Corp., 112 B.R. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), affd, 944 F.2d 997 
(2d Cir. 1991). Any citations to the district courts decision will be denoted as such 
to prevent confusion. 
16. Chateaugay, 944 F.2d at 1000. 
17. See infra note 38 for a discussion of administrative priority in the Bank-
ruptcy Code. 
18. Chateaugay, 112 B.R. at 517. 
19. ld. at 521. 
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brought under CERCLA to be dischargeable in a bankruptcy 
proceeding, the claim must arise prior to the filing of a bank-
ruptcy petition. 20 With respect to injunctions, the court found 
that certain injunctions brought under CERCLA were dis-
chargeable.21 In their analysis, the district court reasoned that 
injunctions which contain an optional right to payment22 fit 
within the definition of dischargeable claims within the Bank-
ruptcy Code.23 
In deciding the priority of dischargeable CERCLA claims in 
a bankruptcy proceeding, the district court found that cleanup 
costs incurred post-petition were entitled to an administrative 
priority.24 The administrative priority classification gives 
CERCLA claims priority over the claims of unsecured credi-
tors.25 The EPA appealed the district court's decision to the 
Second Circuit, and LTV filed a cross appeal.26 The Second 
Circuit upheld the district court's decision, clarifying which 
injunctions are dischargeable and which are not.27 
II. HOLDING OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT IN CHATEAUGAY 
The court in Chateaugay answered some difficult questions 
that other courts addressing the conflict between the Bankrupt-
cy Code and CERCLA have avoided.28 The Chateaugay deci-
sion addressed the following issues: A) when is a CERCLA 
claim dischargeable in a bankruptcy proceeding; B) when is a 
claim for injunctive relief dischargeable; C) do the policies be-
hind CERCLA override the policies of the Bankruptcy Code, 
and therefore provide an exception to the application of the 
Bankruptcy Code's policies; and D) what priority will environ-
mental claims be given in a bankruptcy proceeding? 
20. Id. at 521-22. 
21. Id. at 522-23. 
22. Id. at 522. 
23. Id. at 522-23. 
24. Id. at 525. 
25. See infra note 38 for a discussion of administrative priority in the Bank-
ruptcy Code. 
26. Chateaugay, 944 F.2d at 1001. 
27. Id. at 999. 
28. See In re Combustion Equip. Assoc., 838 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1988) (refusing to 
issue declaratory judgment that CERCLA liability is discharged in a bankruptcy 
proceeding); In re Peerless Plating Co., 70 B.R. 943, 948 (W.D. Mich. 1987) (refus-
ing to decide when a CERCLA claim arises under the bankruptcy code). 
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A. When is a CERCLA Claim Dischargeable? 
In Chateaugay the Second Circuit determined that a bank-
ruptcy proceeding will only discharge CERCLA claims that 
arise prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition.29 The 
Chateaugay court also found that a CERCLA claim arises at 
the time when the acts giving rise to the alleged liability were 
performed.30 Putting these findings together, the court deter-
mined that in order for a CERCLA claim to be dischargeable, 
the claim must be linked to an actual release or threatened 
release of hazardous substances which occurred prior to the 
filing of the bankruptcy petition. 31 
B. When is a Claim for Injunctive Relief Dischargeable? 
The Second Circuit in Chateaugay found that orders for 
injunctive relief under CERCLA are dischargeable in a bank-
ruptcy proceeding if the injunction includes an optional right to 
payment or is an attempt to collect a money judgment.32 How-
ever, this finding was limited by the court. The Second Circuit 
found that where there is no optional right to payment and the 
bankrupt entity still has the ability to comply with the injunc-
tion, the injunction is not dischargeable. 33 
C. Policies Behind CERCLA 
The Second Circuit determined that the Bankruptcy Code 
and CERCLA were in conflict with one another or at least 
pointed toward competing objectives on this issue.34 However, 
the court noted that the Bankruptcy Code is intended to be a 
piece of broad sweeping legislation.35 The Chateaugay court 
further noted that because of this broad sweeping characteris-
tic, the purpose of the Bankruptcy Code is to supersede other 
statutes, which would apply, had the debtor not filed for bank-
ruptcy.36 Therefore, the Second Circuit determined that any 
limits which the Bankruptcy Code imposes on environmental 
29. Chateaugay, 944 F.2d at 1005. 
30. !d. at 1005 (citation omitted). 
31. !d. 
32. !d. at 1008. 
33. !d. 
34. !d. 
35. !d. 
36. !d. 
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cleanup efforts under CERCLA, is a problem for Congress, not 
the courts to remedy. 37 
D. Administrative Priority of an Environmental Claim 
Finally, the Second Circuit determined the priority which 
environmental claims will take in a bankruptcy proceeding. 38 
The Chateaugay court found that monies spent to comply with 
environmental laws such as CERCLA that were incurred post-
petition would be "actual and necessary costs and expenses of 
preserving the estate"39 provided the damage was the result of 
a pre-petition release or threatened release.40 Because the 
monies spent to comply with CERCLA were "necessary costs to 
preserve the estate" the Second Circuit determined that these 
expenses were entitled to an administrative priority.41 
Ill. ANALYSIS OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S REASONING 
A. Dischargeability of CERCLA Claims 
In coming to the decision that CERCLA claims that arise 
due to a pre-petition release or threatened release of hazardous 
substances are dischargeable42, the Second Circuit focused on 
the broad definition of the word "claim" in the Bankruptcy 
Code.43 A key factor in the court's reasoning was the Congres-
37. !d. 
38. In a Bankruptcy proceeding, the trustee in bankruptcy has the responsi-
bility to marshal the debtors assets, to either liquidate or reorganize them, and to 
distribute the secured asset funds to secured creditors. The balance of any funds 
left over are distributed to unsecured creditors. Distribution among the unsecured 
creditors is done according to certain priorities set forth in the Bankruptcy Code. 
See 11 U.S.C. § 503 (1988). Among the unsecured creditors, the Code gives first 
priority to "administrative expenses." See 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(l)(A) (1988), in which 
the Bankruptcy Code accords an administrative priority to "actual, necessary costs 
and expenses of preserving the estate. 
However, because of the enormous costs of environmental cleanup, the reality is 
that even with this priority over other unsecured creditors, the cleanup costs 
usually will not be paid in full. The significance of this priority depends upon the 
financial situation of the debtor and the cost of the cleanup. See infra note 75 for 
a discussion regarding the high cost of cleanup under CERCLA liability. 
39. See 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A) (1988). 
40. Chateaugay, 944 F.2d at 1009-10. 
41. See 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(l)(A). See supra note 38 for a discussion of adminis-
trative priority in the Bankruptcy Code. 
42. Chateaugay, 944 F.2d at 1005. 
43. A "claim" is defined in the Bankruptcy Code as: "[A] right to payment, 
whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, 
contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or 
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sional intent that "all legal obligations of the debtor, no matter 
how remote or contingent, be dealt with in the bankruptcy 
case."44 The court found that CERCLA claims fit within the 
Bankruptcy Code's broad definition of "claims", and that dis-
missal of this type of claim was consistent with Congressional 
intent.45 
Thus, for the court in Chateaugay, the key issue was: 
When does a claim arise for CERCLA purposes? Perhaps the 
district court put it best, when they stated: "[a] claim, even a 
contingent claim, arises under the Bankruptcy Code at 'the 
time when the acts giving rise to the alleged liability were 
performed."46 The Second Circuit applied this definition to 
CERCLA claims by focusing on the event which triggers 
CERCLA liability, i.e. the release or threatened release of haz-
ardous substances. The Second Circuit found that the trigger-
ing event, the release or threatened release of a hazardous sub-
stance, must occur prior to the filing of the bankruptcy peti-
tion.47 The district court explained this relationship very 
clearly: 
So long as there is a pre-petition triggering event, i.e., the 
release or threatened release of hazardous waste, the claim is 
dischargeable, regardless of when the claim for relief may be 
in all respects ripe for adjudication. Very frequently, only one 
part of a tort occurs pre-petition, with the injury occurring 
post-petition. Such claims are nonetheless dischargeable. 48 
Thus, the Second Circuit found that claims that arose prior 
to the filing of the bankruptcy petition were dischargeable. 
Additionally, the Second Circuit determined for purposes of 
CERCLA, a claim arises at the time of the release or threat-
ened release. 
B. Dischargeability of Claims for Injunctive Relief. 
The Second Circuit determined claims for injunctive relief 
unsecured ... [or] a right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if 
such breach gives rise to a right to payment. 11 U.S.C. § 101 (4) (1988). 
44. Chateaugay, 944 F.2d at 1003 (citing H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 309 (1978)). 
45. !d. at 1003-04. 
46. In re Chateaugay Corp. 112 B.R. 513, 520 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), affd, 944 F.2d 
997 (2d Cir. 1991). 
47. !d. 
48. !d. at 522 (footnotes omitted). 
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which have an optional right are dischargeable. The Second 
Circuit's analysis focused on the broad question of whether 
claims for injunctive relief are ever dischargeable. The court 
first focused on the broad definition of "claim" within the Bank-
ruptcy Code.49 They noted that the Bankruptcy Code's defini-
tion of dischargeable claims includes the "right to an equitable 
remedy".50 They found that a claim for injunctive relief clearly 
fell within this definition and should therefore be dis-
charged.51 The court noted the EPA's claim that any right to 
payment that existed was only an optional right, and had not 
yet exercised that right, and therefore any claim that may exist 
should not be discharged.52 In response to this claim, the Sec-
ond Circuit quoted the district court's finding which stated: 
"[e]ven an optional right to payment is nonetheless a right to 
payment and the fact that EPA may not choose to exercise that 
option in no way negates the existence of that right."53 
The Second Circuit did however, limit its holding to the 
above stated rule. It stated: "where there is no right to such 
payment for cleanup or other remedial costs, claims for injunc-
tive relief do not fall within the Bankruptcy [Code] and are not 
dischargeable."54 This was the most troubling issue for the 
Second Circuit in this case. Although they upheld the district 
court's ruling on injunctions, they expounded on the parame-
ters of the above stated exception. With regards to the district 
court's holding in this case, the Second Circuit stated: ''This 
deceptively simple statement perhaps obscures difficult ques-
tions of application because it is not clear which forms of in-
junctive relief [the district court] regards as being an option to 
EPA's right of response cost reimbursement and which entail 
'no right to payment'."55 
In seeking to shed light on the district court's ambiguous 
holding, the Second Circuit distinguished between injunctive 
claims that are dischargeable in bankruptcy proceedings and 
those that are not. The Second Circuit drew the distinction in 
49. Chateaugay, 944 F.2d at 1006. 
50. Id. (citing to 11 U.S.C. § 101(4) (1988)). 
51. Id. at 1007-08. 
52. Id. 
53. Id. at 1001 (quoting In re Chateaugay Corp., 112 B.R. 513, 522 (S.D.N.Y. 
1990), a{fd, 944 F.2d 997 (2d Cir. 1991)). 
54. Id. (citing In re Chateaugay Corp., 512 B.R. 513, 523 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), a{fd, 
944 F.2d 997 (2d Cir. 1991)). 
55. Id. 
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the following manner: 
[A]ny order that to any extent ends or ameliorates continued 
pollution is not an order for breach of an obligation that gives 
rise to a right of payment and is for that reason not a 'claim'. 
But an order to clean up a site, to the extent that it imposes 
obligations distinct from any obligation to stop or ameliorate 
ongoing pollution, is a 'claim' if the creditor obtaining the 
order had the option, which CERCLA confers, to do the clean-
up work itself and sue for response costs, thereby converting 
the injunction into a monetary obligation. 56 
The district court and the Second Circuit rejected LTV's 
argument that any injunction resulting from a pre-petition 
release or threatened release that requires the expenditure of 
money is dischargeable. In so doing, they noted that to accept 
LTV's position would effectively render all injunctive claims 
dischargeable except those that sought the cessation of some 
activity.57 
The Second Circuit distinguished the facts of Chateaugay 
from those of the United States Supreme Court case of Ohio v. 
Kovacs. 58 In Kovacs, the State obtained an injunction ordering 
an individual to clean up a hazardous waste site. Mter he 
failed to comply, a receiver was appointed to take possession of 
the property. Under these facts, where the debtor was no lon-
ger able to comply with the injunction, and where the state 
conceded that it could no longer obtain injunctive relief, the 
Supreme Court found that the claim for injunctive relief had 
been transformed into a dischargeable money judgment. With 
regards to this type of situation as it applies to the facts in 
Chateaugay, the Second Circuit stated: 
To the extent that CERCLA affords EPA and others a right to 
payment in lieu of an order directed solely at cleanup, Kovacs 
indicates that such an order is a "claim." And to the extent 
that an order is obtained under CERCLA or any other envi-
ronmental statute that seeks to end or ameliorate pollution, 
we are satisfied that nothing in Kovacs permits a discharge of 
such obligation. 59 
In coming to its decision, the Chateaugay court focused on 
56. ld. at 1008. 
57. ld. 
58. 469 U.S. 274 (1985). 
59. Chateaugay, 944 F.2d at 1009. 
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the ability to comply with the injunction. Under this analysis, 
in a situation brought under CERCLA where the EPA does not 
have a contingent right to payment, and the bankrupt party 
still has the ability to comply with the injunction, the liability 
is not dischargeable. In coming to this conclusion, Chateaugay 
implicitly rejects the Sixth Circuit's bright line holding that an 
injunction is dischargeable if compliance with the injunctive 
order requires the bankrupt debtor to expend money.60 
The Sixth Circuit took a very bright line approach in Unit-
ed States v. Whizco61• In Whizco, the United States sought to 
obtain an injunction against a coal company to compel them to 
reclaim an abandoned mine pursuant to statutory obliga-
tions.62 The Sixth Circuit found that an injunction which com-
pels the bankrupt debtor to expend money in order to fulfill its 
obligation is a claim as defined in the Bankruptcy Code, and as 
such is dischargeable. The Sixth Circuit did, however, narrow 
its opinion by adding: "[t]o the extent that the defendant can 
comply with the orders without spending money, his bankrupt-
cy did not discharge his obligation to comply with the or-
ders."63 
C. Policy Considerations Behind CERCLA 
The Second Circuit determined that CERCLA policy does 
not override the Bankruptcy Code's broad sweeping policy ob-
jectives.64 To begin their analysis, the Second Circuit pointed 
out that the conflict which exists between the Bankruptcy Code 
and CERCLA is not a direct conflict in the statutes, but rather 
two statutes that have different destinations which conflict in 
this specific application.65 
The court's analysis focused on the Bankruptcy Code's 
important "fresh start" objective. The court focused on the fact 
that the Bankruptcy Code was intended to supersede other 
statutes. The Bankruptcy Code is used to override statutes that 
would clearly apply and provide a creditor with full payment in 
60. See United States v. Whizco, 841 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1988). 
61. 841 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1988). 
62. The statute under which the coal company was obliged to reclaim the mine 
was the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977. 18 U.S.C. § 1201 
(1988). An in depth discussion of this act and its requirements is beyond the scope 
of this note. 
63. Whizco, 841 F.2d at 151. 
64. Chateaugay, 944 F.2d at 1002. 
65. !d. 
443] IN RE CHATEAUGAY CORP. 453 
the absence of bankruptcy. 66 The Second Circuit accepted the 
district court's very broad interpretation of the term "claim".67 
This broad interpretation creates a situation where any excep-
tions to dischargeability are construed very narrowly by the 
courts.68 
The Second Circuit also pointed out that Congress has 
failed to clearly manifest an intent that CERCLA claims not be 
discharged. The court continued by stating: "[l]f the [Bankrupt-
cy C]ode, fairly construed, creates limits on the extent of envi-
ronmental cleanup efforts, the remedy is for Congress to make 
exceptions to the Code to achieve other objectives that Con-
gress chooses to reach, rather than for courts to restrict the 
meaning of across the board legislation like the Bankruptcy 
Code, in order to promote objectives evident in more focused 
statutes."69 
D. Priority of Environmental Claims. 
In Chateaugay, the Second Circuit found that costs associ-
ated with CERCLA claims incurred post-petition are entitled to 
administrative priority under Section 503(b)(l)(A) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code.70 Because the defendant in Chateaugay contin-
ued to own and operate the contaminated site post-petition, the 
court also found that the defendant was under a continuing 
obligation to comply with environmental laws.71 For that rea-
son, the Chateaugay court held that the money spent for com-
pliance, and even the civil penalties for post-petition violations, 
would be treated as administrative expenses as long as they 
were the result of a pre-petition release or threatened re-
lease. 72 In supporting this finding, the Second Circuit noted 
that this holding does not eliminate the Bankruptcy Code's 
requirement that notice be given to creditors before an admin-
istrative priority is granted.73 
Although this decision makes the clear determination that 
CERCLA claims that arise post-petition are entitled to an ad-
ministrative priority, it does not change the Bankruptcy Code's 
66. !d. 
67. !d. 
68. !d. 
69. !d. 
70. ld. at 1010. 
71. ld. at 1009. 
72. ld. 
73. ld. at 1010 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A) (1988)). 
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requirements that notice be given, and a hearing held. 74 These 
requirements serve as a check on this ruling, allowing each 
claim for administrative priority to be considered on an individ-
ual basis. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The high cost of environmental claims makes bankruptcy 
'an option an individual, business or corporation must consider 
when faced with the enormous financial costs that CERCLA 
cleanup requires. 75 In fact, bankruptcy under the current laws 
is often more attractive than facing potential environmental 
liability. 
The Chateaugay case illustrates a situation where the 
policies behind the Bankruptcy Code and CERCLA conflict with 
each other. Because Congress has failed to provide any specific 
guidance with respect to this conflict, the courts have been left 
to sort through the issues raised by this conflict. The Second 
Circuit's decision in In re Chateaugay Corp. 76 has addressed 
and presented some possible answers to some of these issues. 
The Chateaugay decision determined that a claim under 
CERCLA which arises due to a release or threatened release of 
hazardous substances that occurs prior to the filing of a bank-
ruptcy petition, is a dischargeable claim within the Bankruptcy 
Code. 
The Chateaugay court also decided that claims for injunc-
tive relief are also dischargeable if the injunctive claim is ac-
companied with an optional right to payment. The court limited 
this holding however, by stating that if there was no optional 
right to payment, then the claim is not dischargeable, even if 
compliance requires the bankrupt defendant to spend money. 
The Chateaugay court also decided that the policies behind 
CERCLA do not override those of the Bankruptcy Code. The 
court determined that the Bankruptcy Code is a broad-sweep-
ing statute that was passed with the intention to override other 
provisions of the law that otherwise would apply in the absence 
of bankruptcy, They found that restricting across the board 
74. See 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A). 
75. It is estimated that the average cleanup site will require $10 million to 
rehabilitate. In addition, it is estimated that the cleanup of all contaminated cites 
would require the expenditure of $100-700 billion. FREDERICK R. ANDERSON, ET 
AL., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW AND POLICY 614, 617 (2d ed. 1990). 
76. 944 F.2d 997 (2d Cir. 1991). 
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legislation such as the Bankruptcy Code was a task for Con-
gress and not the courts. 
The last issue that the Chateaugay court decided was that 
CERCLA claims which arise after the filing of the bankruptcy 
petition would be given an administrative priority. This gives 
CERCLA claims in this category priority over unsecured credi-
tors. To qualify for this priority, a claim must arise post-peti-
tion. In addition, any claims that are given administrative 
priority are required to be necessary expenses for the preserva-
tion of the estate. 
As a result of the conflict between the Bankruptcy Code 
and CERCLA, a body of case-law is slowly emerging regarding 
the important issues that result from this conflict. However, 
the case-law that has emerged thus far is new and untested in 
many ways. Some conflicts now exist, and in the coming years, 
some new conflicts may arise. Some of these conflicts will be 
resolved by the Judiciary, and others will be left to be resolved 
by the Congress. 
Thomas L. Stockard 
